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Abstract
An incumbent postal service provider faces two issues which make the design
of e¢ cient access pricing especially di¢ cult. First, universal service obligations,
together with the presence of signicant xed costs, require retail prices to be
out of line with underlying marginal costs. Second, competing rms may be
able to bypass the incumbents delivery network. Within a simple framework,
this note analyses how access charges should best be set in the light of these
twin constraints.
1 Introduction
In an ideal world, a regulated rms retail prices would be equal to its marginal
costs of supply. In such a world, policy towards entry and access pricing is relatively
straightforward, as we will see in the analysis which follows. However, for most of
the regulated network industries, including post, there are three main reasons why
regulated retail prices may diverge from the underlying marginal costs. First, the
regulated rm may have signicant xed costs, and prices need to be above marginal
costs for the rm to remain protable. Second, the rm has invested in sunk and
durable assets, and current prices need to ensure that this investment is compensated
adequately (if it was incurred prudently). Otherwise, faith in the regulatory system
is eroded and the cost of capital rises to the long-run detriment of consumers. Third,
This paper was presented at the conference on Regulation, competition and universal service in
the postal sector, held in Toulouse on March 16-17, 2006. I am very grateful to helpful comments
from Bruno Jullien, Frank Rodriguez and David Sappington.
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there may be mandated cross-subsidies from one group of users to another, for dis-
tributional or political reasons. The obvious example of this last practice in post is
the common requirement to o¤er uniform prices for delivery of specied mail services
to all addresses, even though the cost of provision (especially of delivery) varies in
di¤erent regions. In practice, since retail prices for important services such as basic
mail are so visible and politically sensitive, considerations other than pure economic
e¢ ciency come into play when these prices are chosen by regulators and politicians.1
The same is not as true with access prices, which in this note can be employed for
the focussed task of ensuring there is productive e¢ ciency.
Whenever regulated retail prices deviate from the incumbents marginal costs,
there will be di¢ culties with laissez-faire entry (or, when access is required, when the
incumbents access charges are equal to its marginal costs of providing access). In
particular, there is a danger of ine¢ cient entry in protable segments and a danger
of a lack of e¢ cient entry in loss-making segments. In addition there is the funding
problem: if cream-skimming entry eliminates prots from hitherto protable markets,
the incumbent may be unable to continue nancing its xed and sunk costs as well
as its loss-making universal service operations. Because of these three problems, it
is often suggested not least by the incumbents themselves that competition and
universal service requirements do not mix well.
Since they have nothing intrinsically to do with the presence of essential inputs
and access charges, for simplicity in section 2 I discuss these issues assuming that
entrants do not need access to the incumbents delivery network to provide their
services. When the incumbents retail prices diverge from its marginal costs of supply,
e¢ cient entry can be ensured by requiring entrants to pay an output tax equal to
the incumbents prot margin. Such output taxes could be administered within the
framework of a universal service fund. This analysis is then incorporated into the more
realistic setting of section 3, where entrants may require access to the incumbents
delivery network to be able to o¤er their own service. This discussion is divided into
situations in which entrants must use the incumbents network, and into situations
where entrants have the ability to self-deliver their mail if the incumbents access
charge is too high. In the rst case, the output taxes proposed in section 2 can
1For further discussion on the rationale for universal service policies (in telecommunications), see
Riordan (2002) and Chapter 6 of La¤ont and Tirole (2000).
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simply and conveniently be levied via the incumbents access charges, and this results
in the so-called e¢ cient component pricing rule (ECPR) for access charges. In
the second case, though, these ECPR access charges which need not be closely
related to the underlying costs of delivering mail may induce ine¢ cient bypass of
the incumbents delivery network by entrants. Therefore, the regulator ideally needs
to use two instruments: an output tax on entrants and cost-based charges for access
to the incumbents delivery network. As in section 2, the output tax component of
this regime can be implemented via a universal service fund. A theme of the analysis
is that regulation can be simplied considerably if the incumbents retail prices are
rebalanced to reect the underlying costs, to the extent that is politically feasible.
A brief summary of related literature goes as follows. To a large extent, this
note re-works the telecommunications discussion presented in Armstrong (2001) to
be relevant to the postal sector. The analysis is extended somewhat to allow for
xed costs incurred by the incumbent and entrant, and the discussion is expanded
at various points. Armstrong (2002, section 2) extends Armstrong (2001) to allow
for product di¤erentiation, downward-sloping consumer demand, competing entrants,
and other factors, without changing the qualitative insights obtained in the simple
setting presented in Armstrong (2001) and the present note.
La¤ont and Tirole (2000, pages 118119) discuss the benets of imposing output
taxes on entrants and note that their use would imply that cost-based access charges
are optimal (as conrmed in this note). They suggest that the use of these kinds
of taxes is politically unlikely, but go on to suggest that these taxes could be
repackaged as a tax on the whole industry so as to make them seem less discriminatory
(again, as is done in this note).
Another closely related paper is De Donder (2006), whose analysis is largely com-
plementary to mine. De Donder focusses more on the Ramsey approach, where
retail and access prices are chosen simultaneously to maximize the regulators objec-
tive. On the other hand, I take the incumbents retail prices as exogenously xed
in the analysis of the optimal access prices. A second di¤erence is that De Donder
considers a wider range of competitive strategies than I do, and in particular, he
analyzes worksharing, where large customers can pre-sort their mail and give it to
the incumbent to deliver. Thirdly, De Donder does not consider the use of output
taxes as an additional instrument to a¤ect entry incentives.
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2 Entry and Universal Service
Consider a specic postal service o¤ered by an incumbent. Suppose the incumbent
incurs a cost C per unit of supply of this service.2 Suppose the incumbents quality
of service is denoted U . The price for its service is mandated to be P per unit, where,
perhaps because of universal service requirements or the need to cover xed costs,
P is not necessarily close to the cost C. Consumer demand for the service is an
increasing function of quality net of price, [U   P ]. Specically, suppose consumer
demand for the postal service with quality U and P is Q(U   P ), while consumer
surplus is V (U   P ). To save on notation, suppose that with the price P consumer
demand for the incumbents service is Q = Q(U   P ) while consumer surplus is
V  = V (U   P ).
There is a potential entrant which can supply its own service that costs c per unit
and has possibly di¤erent service quality u.3 The entrant is free to set its price p.
All consumers will obtain their supplies from the incumbent if U   P > u   p, and
otherwise they will obtain the service from the entrant. Therefore, if it chooses to
enter, the entrant will choose its price to be equal to the quality adjustedprice of
the incumbent:
p = P + [u  U ] : (1)
In this case, the demand for postal service is unchanged and equal to Q, while
consumer surplus is unchanged at V .
In addition, the entrant incurs an entry cost f if it chooses to enter this market.
This cost f represents the barriers to entry in the market, which are faced by the
entrant but not the incumbent. (For instance, the entrant might need to advertise its
presence in a way that the incumbent does not.) In sum, total welfare as measured
throughout this note by the simple sum of consumer surplus and industry prot is
given by
V  + (P   C)Q with no entry
V  + (P + [u  U ]  c)Q   f with entry .
2All costs include a reasonable rate of return on capital, and hence contain a contribution to
protin accounting terms.
3The following analysis is not a¤ected if the entrant can choose its service quality u, perhaps
by changing its xed and marginal costs. In fact, in this simple framework in which the rm
can perfectly extract consumer willingness-to-pay for higher quality, the rm will o¤er the socially
optimal level of service quality if it enters the market.
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Therefore, entry is socially desirable if
(u  c)Q   f  (U   C)Q : (2)
But when will entry take place? Given price P , the entrant will set the price in
expression (1). Entry is therefore protable whenever (P + [u  U ]  c)Q   f  0,
i.e., whenever
(u  c)Q   f  (U   P )Q : (3)
Whenever P di¤ers from C, therefore, expressions (2) and (3) demonstrate that
private and social incentives for entry diverge.
There are two kinds of market failure, depending on whether the particular service
is protable or loss-making for the incumbent. First, suppose the service is protable,
so P > C. If the entrants characteristics (u; c; f) are such that
(U   C)Q > (u  c)Q   f > (U   P )Q ;
then entry occurs even though it is socially undesirable. That is to say, entry can
protably take place when the entrant has higher costs and/or lower service quality
than the incumbent. Alternatively, if P < C then whenever
(U   C)Q < (u  c)Q   f < (U   P )Q
it is socially desirable for entry to take place, yet it is not privately protable. In
other words, there is a lack of e¢ cient entry.
At least in theory, it is a straightforward matter to correct this divergence between
the private and social incentives for entry, even if the regulator wishes to maintain
the non-cost-reective retail price P and does not know the entrants characteristics
(u; c; f). The incumbent can be considered to be paying an output tax equal to
T = P   C (4)
per unit which is positive or negative depending on the regulated price P and
e¢ ciency is ensured provided the entrant also pays this tax for each unit it supplies.4
This output tax corrects what would otherwise be a divergence between private and
social incentives to enter. Notice this output tax (4) is equal to the incumbents lost
4With this tax T the entrant nds entry protable when (c+ T )Q + f  (P + [u  U ])Q, i.e.,
whenever (2) holds, as claimed.
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prot or opportunity cost when it ceases to supply a unit of the specied service.
From an e¢ ciency point of view it makes little di¤erence whether the proceeds from
the entrants output tax are paid directly to the incumbent, to the public purse, or
into an industry universal service fund. However, if the incumbent has historically
been using the proceeds from protable sectors to nance its xed or sunk costs or
other loss-making activities then, if the entrant pays the tax to the incumbent or into
an industry fund, the incumbent will not face funding problems should entry into
protable markets in fact occur.
While it may seem a little abstract, not to say administratively burdensome, to use
these kinds of output taxes to correct for distortions in the incumbents retail prices,
these taxes can sometimes be implemented in a simple and non-discriminatory way
via a well-designed universal service fund. This procedure can be illustrated by means
of a simple example, which uses purely illustrative gures, summarized in Table 1. (I
return to variants of this example later in the note.)
Here, the incumbent o¤ers a universal mail service. Letters delivered to rural areas
incur a higher cost (50p) compared to letters destined for urban areas (20p). For now,
suppose there are no xed costs associated with these services for the incumbent.
Universal service obligations require the incumbent to o¤er both services at the same
stamp price, 30p, and the rm makes a prot from letters to urban areas that just
covers its loss from delivering letters to rural areas.
Table 1: Using a universal service fund to give correct entry incentives
urban delivery rural delivery
number of letters 2bn 1bn
incumbents cost per letter 20p 50p
incumbents stamp price 30p 30p
incumbents overall prot £ 200m prot £ 200m loss
entrants contribution to fund per letter 10p -20p
As discussed, a laissez-faire approach towards entry in this pair of markets will
likely lead to (i) ine¢ cient entry to the protable urban delivery sector, (ii) too
little e¢ cient entry into the rural delivery sector, and (iii) funding di¢ culties for the
incumbent in the event of cream-skimming entry into the urban delivery sector. To
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counter these problems, suppose a universal service fund is set up containing £ 200m
to nance rural service provision. The fund is nanced by the prot generated in
the urban delivery sector, and any rm entrants and the incumbent must pay 10p
(the incumbents prot margin in this sector) into this fund for each letter it delivers
to urban areas. In return, any rm which delivers letters to rural areas receives a
subsidy from the fund equal to 20p (the incumbents per-letter loss in that sector) per
letter. Providing the quantities of letters delivered to the two areas remains largely
unchanged with entry, such a fund is self-nancing, and widespread urban entry does
not undermine the ability of the incumbent to serve the loss-making rural market.
More important from an e¢ ciency viewpoint is the feature that the contribution
scheme ensures that in each market the entrant has to pay the output tax (4), which
gives it the appropriate entry incentives. Therefore, the most e¢ cient rm succeeds
in each sector.
To achieve these desirable e¢ ciency properties, it is important that an entrants
contribution to the fund be sensitive to the prot margins in the markets in which
there is entry. For instance, an alternative nancing arrangement for the universal
service fund might be to require an entrant to make its contribution purely as a
proportion of its total revenues, say. Such an arrangement is much simpler from
an administrative viewpoint (and perhaps less susceptible to manipulation by an
entrant), since only aggregate data from the entrant is needed. This arrangement, if
suitably designed, can also ensure the incumbent does not run into funding problems
if there is cream-skimming entry into its protable markets. However, this method of
nancing the universal fund does not tackle the essential e¢ ciency problems discussed
above: there will still be the danger of ine¢ cient entry in the urban market and lack
of e¢ cient entry in the rural market.5
Notice that if the incumbents retail prices were rebalanced to come into line
with its costs (so that a letter to urban areas needed a 20p stamp and a letter to rural
areas needed a 50p stamp in this particular example), there would be no need to set
up the universal service fund. A policy of free entry would work well in the absence
5This issue is most acute when an entrants service displaces the incumbents service in a one-
for-one manner, as assumed in this note. If instead, the entrants service displaces only a fraction
of the incumbents service, then the required output taxes are less sensitive to the incumbents
prot margins. In the limit, if the entrants service does not displace the incumbents at all, there
is no need to levy output taxes, even if the incumbents retail prices do not reect its costs. See
Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers (1996) for further details.
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of any tax and subsidy scheme. In the case of basic postal service, it seems unlikely
that such rebalancing will be politically acceptable in most countries for some time
to come. However, policy towards bulk mail is often more exible in this regard, and
there is sometimes scope for prices which better reect the underlying costs in this
market.
Another reason why rebalancing is not a panacea is the existence of xed costs.
If prices reect marginal costs, the incumbent cannot recover its total costs. Instead,
regulated prices will have to be above marginal costs (at least on average). The pres-
ence of price-cost margins can lead to ine¢ cient, cream-skimming entry in protable
markets, just as was seen when cross-subsidies were present. The previous analysis
assumed that all costs (20p and 50p in the table) were avoidable. In the case of postal
services, in reality a substantial fraction of costs are xed in nature. Suppose that,
in addition to the marginal costs presented in Table 1 there is also a xed cost, joint
to the two sectors, equal to £ 600m. Since in Table 1 the total variable costs come to
£ 900m, the xed cost makes up 40% of the total cost.
Suppose rst that a uniform stamp price in the two kinds of region is required.
To keep the argument simple, suppose that consumer demand in the two sectors is
perfectly inelastic. In order to cover the total costs of £ 1,500m, a uniform stamp
price of 50p is needed. In this case, the output tax is increased by 20p in each region:
an entrant should now pay 30p into the fund for each urban letter it delivers, and pay
nothing when it delivers a letter to a rural area. These access charges ensure that (i)
entrants enter only when they are more e¢ cient, and (ii) the incumbents xed cost
is nanced if entry occurs.
Suppose next that rebalancing of retail prices is politically feasible. For instance,
this might be possible if the service in question is bulk mail rather than individual
stamped mail. As discussed above, the presence of xed costs means that some form
of output tax on entrants is required to prevent ine¢ cient cream-skimming entry, no
matter how fully the incumbents prices are rebalanced. However, rebalancing can
a¤ect the ease with which a universal service fund is administered. To be concrete,
suppose that the incumbents retail prices are regulated so that there is an equi-
proportionate mark-up over the associated marginal costs. In the example in Table
1, the prices which are equally marked-up over costs and which just cover the xed
cost of £ 600m are 331
3
p in the urban sector and 831
3
p in the rural sector. The benet
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of the equi-proportionate rule (which is otherwise ad hoc) is that the tax regime for
the entrants becomes simple: an entrant should pay a xed proportion (in this case,
40%, the fraction of xed costs in total costs for the incumbent) of its total revenue
into the industry fund. Thus, rebalancing in this particular way has the signicant
advantage that the entrants output taxes can be deducted from its total revenue,
and the detailed pattern of entry in the two kinds of regions does not matter.
3 Access to the Incumbents Delivery Network
Here I extend the framework in the direction of greater realism so that entrants
might require access to the incumbents delivery network. Specically, there is a
vertically-integrated incumbent and a potential entrant which might need access to
the incumbents delivery network to be able to compete with the incumbent at the
retail level for a specied service (e.g., letters delivered to rural destinations). The
incumbent incurs a cost C1 per unit for providing its end-to-end retail service and a
cost C2 for providing a unit of delivery service to the entrant. The incumbents retail
service has quality U , and it must charge the regulated retail price P . In addition,
the rm levies the per-unit access charge A when it provides delivery service for the
entrant. In section 3.1 I discuss the case where the entrant requires precisely one unit
of the incumbents delivery access service for each unit of own service, and then turn in
section 3.2 to situations where the entrant can selectively bypassthe incumbents
delivery network. The rst situation is relevant when it is either uneconomic for
an entrant to deliver its own mail, or where the incumbent operator holds a legal
monopoly over delivering letters.6 The second case is relevant for bulk mail services
when policy permits self-delivery by entrants.
3.1 No bypass of the incumbents delivery network
In this section I assume that bypass of the incumbents delivery network is not feasible
for the service in question, so that the entrant requires the incumbent to deliver each
item of its mail. As before, the entrants service has quality u. When the entrant has
access to the incumbents delivery network, it incurs the additional cost c to provide
the retail element of its service. That is to say, the unit cost when the entrant supplies
6In the United States, the incumbent is (broadly speaking) the only rm permitted to access
customer mailboxes.
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a unit is C2 + c. As before, the entrant also incurs the xed cost of entry, f . Since
the entrant will choose its price to be as given in (1), total welfare with and without
entry is equal to
V  + (P   C1)Q with no entry
V  + (P + [u  U ]  [c+ C2])Q   f with entry .
Therefore, entry is socially desirable if
(u  c)Q   f  (U   [C1   C2])Q : (5)
Similarly to expression (3) above, entry will actually take place when the entrants
margin [P   A] is large enough to satisfy
(u  c)Q   f  (U   [P   A])Q : (6)
Therefore, from expressions (5) and (6) the private incentive to enter coincides with
social benet only when P   A = C1   C2, or when
A = C2|{z}
cost of delivery
+ P   C1| {z } :
retail prot
(7)
This formula is an instance of the famous e¢ cient component pricing rule(ECPR)
policy for pricing network access.7 This policy requires that the access charge should
equal the incumbents cost of delivering letters, C2, plus the optimal output tax in (4)
above, which is T = P C1. Since the entrant is here unable to bypass the incumbents
delivery network, a regulator might just as well levy the output tax which is required
to correct for the regulated retail pricing distortions on the entrants input, and this
is exactly what policy (7) entails. Such a procedure eliminates the need directly to
observe entrantsoutputs.
A by-product of the ECPR access pricing policy is that the incumbents prot
in the market in question is not a¤ected by whether or not there is entry. When
the access charge is given by (7), the incumbent makes prot (P   C1)Q in either
event. This implies that when the ECPR policy is followed, the incumbent may have
a reduced incentive to lobby against entry, or to articially degrade or delay the
entrants access service. When the access charge is set at a lower level than (7), the
incumbent may have an incentive to sabotage the entrant by o¤ering an inferior
7See Willig (1979) and Baumol (1983) for early discussions of this policy, and section 2.1 of
Armstrong (2002) for further analysis and references.
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access service. One important advantage of an ECPR policy, therefore, is that it
lessens the incumbents motive to use non-price means to disadvantage its rivals, and
so the regulator has less need to undertake detailed and intrusive investigation into
the incumbents non-price behaviour.8
We can illustrate this ECPR policy in an extension of the above example, summa-
rized in Table 2. Here, two components needed to provide an end-to-end mail service:
pick upand delivery.9 The incumbent is assumed to incur the same pick up cost
for all letters but its delivery cost di¤ers in the two kinds of region. The entrant is
reliant on the incumbents delivery network to provide its own mail service.
Table 2: The ECPR access charge with no bypass
urban delivery rural delivery
incumbents total cost per letter, of which 20p 50p
pick up cost is 10p 10p
delivery cost is 10p 40p
incumbents stamp price 30p 30p
ECPR access charge for delivery 20p 20p
In this context, the ECPR formula (7) implies the optimal access charge for de-
livery is 20p per letter, which in this example is the geographically-averaged cost
of delivery.10 With this delivery charge entry will be protable only if the entrant
has a lower pick up cost than the incumbent (or provides a higher quality service).
Notice that the optimal access charge is geographically uniform even though the ac-
tual delivery costs vary over the two types of region. The reason for this is that the
incumbents stamp price is uniform and its pick up cost is also uniform. This policy
is superior to a cost-based access charging policy, which would require charging for
urban delivery at 10p and charging for rural delivery at 40p. For instance, with an
urban delivery charge of 10p the entrant could have a pick up cost as high as 20p
per letter (compared to the incumbents pick up cost of 10p) and still nd entry into
8See La¤ont and Tirole (2000, section 4.5), for instance.
9I assume that the associated sorting costs are included in these two costs.
10The fact that the ECPR delivery charge is equal to the geographical average of actual delivery
costs is due to the assumption that the incumbents services just break even over the two markets.
For instance, if the market runs at a loss overall, the ECPR access charge would be below the
average delivery cost.
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that sector to be protable. And with a rural delivery access charge of 40p no en-
trant (unless it can o¤er a hugely higher quality service) could compete against the
incumbents subsidised stamp price of 30p for that service.
It makes little di¤erence to this analysis if the incumbents delivery costs are
largely xed rather than incurred on a per-letter basis. (Since virtually all addresses
are passed by a deliverer each working day, it is plausible that the cost of delivering
an extra letter is small.) The ECPR is a retail-minuspolicy, and the access charge
is equal to the incumbents retail price (here, 30p) minus its avoided cost (here, the
pick up cost is 10p), and the magnitude of the marginal letter delivery cost plays no
role. Of course, though, the calculation is sensitive to assumptions about whether
the pick up cost element is largely variable or largely xed in nature.
In sum, when entrants have no realistic scope for delivering letters themselves
(either because it is uneconomic, or because regulatory policy forbids bypass), and
when the incumbents retail prices are regulated, the ECPR formula for pricing access
by entrants to the incumbents delivery network is an appropriate guide for policy.
However, there are situations (such as sometimes with bulk mail) where entrants can
realistically deliver their own mail, in which case this framework does not apply well.
Since the ECPR policy entails access charges which do not accurately reect the
underlying costs, the policy is not always appropriate when an entrant can bypass
the incumbents delivery network when its own delivery cost is lower than the ECPR
access charge.
3.2 Allowing for bypass of the incumbents delivery network
Suppose next the entrant has scope to deliver its own mail. As mentioned, this is
most likely to apply with bulk mail services. When the entrant does so suppose that
it incurs a cost c^1 per unit for its end-to-end retail service, and this service has quality
u^. (Quality u^ may di¤er from u if using the incumbents delivery service degrades
or enhances the entrants service compared to its stand-alone service.) Suppose that
the entrants xed entry cost when the entrant bypasses the incumbents delivery
network is f^ . Since the entrant will have to invest in additional infrastructure if it is
to deliver its own mail, it is plausible that f^ > f . The entrant now has three choices:
it can provide the end-to-end service itself; it can enter by using the incumbents
delivery network, or it can not enter at all. As in expression (1), the entrant will
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charge P +[u^ U ] for its end-to-end service and P +[u U ] for its service which uses
the incumbents delivery network. Total welfare with these possible entry strategies
is therefore
V  + (P   C1)Q with no entry
V  + (P + [u^  U ]  c^1)Q   f^ with stand-alone entry
V  + (P + [u  U ]  [c+ C2])Q   f with entry via incumbents network.
(8)
Which regulatory policy ensures the maximum value of welfare in (8) is achieved?
Since the relationship between the entrants inputs and outputs is no longer a xed
one, the regulator will need, if administratively feasible, to use both an access charge
and an output tax to attain the best outcome. Indeed, if the regulator can only
use the instrument of the access charge A, it is quite possible that entry can reduce
total welfare. To see this, consider the situation where all service qualities are equal
(u = u^ = U) and where the entrants xed entry costs are zero (f = f^ = 0). In this
case, total welfare decreases if and only if the unit cost of supply increases. Suppose
the entrants characteristics satisfy
P > c^1 > C1 ; c > [C1   C2] :
In this case unit supply costs must rise, no matter what access charge is chosen.
(Since P > c^1, when there is no output tax there will certainly be entry of some form.
Since c^1 > C1, stand-alone entry will raise costs. And since c > [C1   C2], entry via
the incumbents network will also raise costs.) Therefore, entry will reduce welfare.11
When the regulator can use both an output tax and an access charge, it is possible
to design policy so that entry occurs only when it is socially desirable. Moreover, when
entry does occur, the entrant will choose the optimal mode of entry: stand-alone entry
or by the use of the incumbents delivery network.12 To see this, suppose regulatory
11The numerical simulations in De Donder (2006) conrm that entry can be worse for welfare
than monopoly, even when the access charge is chosen optimally. (See his Table 1.) See Armstrong,
Doyle, and Vickers (1996) and section 2.4.2 of Armstrong (2002) for further discussion of the case
where the access charge is the only instrument available. In general, since the access charge has to
perform two tasks a compromise must be made, and a degree of productive ine¢ ciency necessarily
results.
12The focus of this note is on the situation where the incumbents retail price is xed exogenously.
In the alternative Ramsey situation, where retail prices are chosen endogenously, the same basic
dichotomy which is described in this note also holds. That is to say, if the regulator can use an
access charge and an output tax, it is still optimal to use the access charge to give entrants the
e¢ cient make-or-buy decisions, i.e., to set A = C2. (See Armstrong (2002, section 2.5.2) for further
discussion.) This is an instance of the general point that productive e¢ ciency is desirable when
enough tax instruments are available see Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).
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policy requires the entrant to pay a tax T per unit of its output and a charge A to
the incumbent when the latter delivers a unit of the formers service. The entrants
prot when it supplies the end-to-end service itself is then
(P + [u^  U ]  [T + c^1])Q   f^ : (9)
The entrants prot if it instead employs the incumbents delivery network is
(P + [u  U ]  [T + A+ c])Q   f : (10)
Therefore, given that entry takes place, by comparing expressions (9) and (10) we
see that the entrant will choose to make use of the incumbents delivery network
whenever
AQ  ([u  u^] + [c^1   c])Q + [f^   f ] :
On the other hand, given that entry occurs, expression (8) implies welfare is higher
when the entrant uses the incumbents delivery network whenever
C2Q
  ([u  u^] + [c^1   c])Q + [f^   f ] :
Therefore, given that entry takes place, private and social incentives for the entrant
to use the incumbents network are brought into line by choosing the access charge
to equal the incumbents cost of delivering a unit of service, so that A = C2. Making
the access charge equal the incumbents cost of providing delivery service gives the
entrant the appropriate price signal about whether or not to bypass the incumbents
delivery network.
Turning next to the appropriate choice for the output tax, following the previous
discussion in section 2 the ideal output tax is given by T = P   C1 per unit, as in
expression (4) above. With these choices for A and T we see that the entrants prot
under each of its three options for entry are:
0 with no entry
([u^  U ] + [C1   c^1])Q   f^ with stand-alone entry
([u  U ] + [C1   c  C2])Q   f with entry via incumbents network.
Comparing these prots with social welfare in (8) we see that the entrants private
incentives are now in line with welfare: the entrant will enter the market when it is
socially optimal for it to do so, and if it does enter it will use the incumbents delivery
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network whenever it is e¢ cient to do so. We summarise this discussion by recording
that the optimal policy in this situation is for the regulator to set:
A = C2 ; T = P   C1 : (11)
An alternative way to present this policy is that when entry occurs: (i) if the entrant
uses the incumbents network it pays the ECPR access charge (7), and (ii) if the
entrant does not use the incumbents network, it must pay the output tax (4).
Unlike the situation in section 3.1, here it is important whether the incumbents
delivery costs are avoidable or not. To give the entrant the correct incentive to
use the incumbents delivery network, the access charge should be set equal to the
incumbents marginal (or avoidable) costs of delivery. If the delivery network is largely
a xed cost, so that C2 is small, it is probably e¢ cient that an entrant use the same
delivery network.
The output tax element of this regulatory policy can again be implemented by
means of an industry universal service fund, as described in Table 3. For now, suppose
that the incumbent incurs no xed costs, and all its relevant costs are reported as in
the table.
Table 3: Giving appropriate entry and bypass incentives
urban delivery rural delivery
incumbents total cost per letter, of which 20p 50p
pick up cost is 10p 10p
delivery cost is 10p 40p
incumbents stamp price 30p 30p
entrants contribution to fund per letter 10p 20p
incumbents access charge for delivery 10p 40p
Here, there is a universal service fund that operates just as in Table 1: a rm send-
ing mail to an urban address must contribute 10p to this fund, and a rm sending mail
to a rural address can receive 20p from the fund. In addition to these contributions,
the entrant can gain access to the incumbents delivery network at actual cost (not
the geographically averaged cost as in Table 2).13 Notice that if the entrant uses the
13These cost-related delivery charges are sometimes termed zonal access charges. With the (per-
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incumbents delivery network, its total payment is the ECPR charge of 20p per letter
for both kinds of destinations, just as in Table 2. However, the advantage of splitting
the ECPR charge into two elements a cost-based access charge together with an
output tax is that when self-delivery by entrants is a possibility it is undesirable to
make the incumbents delivery access charges deviate from the incumbents delivery
costs, since that policy invites ine¢ cient bypass of the incumbents delivery network.
In particular, consider the possible problems which arise if the ECPR price (7)
were used as a basis for policy, without the additional use of output taxes. In the
example, this would mean that the incumbent be required to deliver all letters from
entrants at the price of 20p per letter. For letters destined for rural locations, this
subsidised charge means that an entrant can sucessfully compete against the incum-
bent if its pick upcost is no greater than 10p, and this outcome is e¢ cient.14 For
letters destined for urban locations, however, the inated access price will tempt some
entrants to deliver their own letters. This could well be ine¢ cient. For instance, an
entrant might have a urban delivery cost as high as 20p, as compared to incumbents
delivery cost of 10p, and still prefer to deliver the letters itself. In addition to this
danger of ine¢ cient bypass, there remains the funding issue that the incumbent may
be unable to continue funding its loss-making operations if its prots are eroded in
this manner by cream-skimming entry. If the incumbents access charges are regulated
according to the ECPR policy (with no output taxes placed on entrants), then the
regulator must nd some other mechanism to limit the danger of ine¢ ciency posed
by selective bypass of the incumbents delivery network.
The intricate regulation illustrated in Table 3 can be greatly simplied if the
incumbents retail prices for the specied service were rebalanced to reect the un-
derlying costs. (For business services such as bulk mail, for instance, there is less
political imperative for the uniform prices associated with universal service.) If retail
prices are rebalanced in this way, then policy towards access pricing is more straight-
forward for these services. For instance, in the context of Table 3, if the incumbent
haps rather extreme) numbers in this example, the rural access charge of 40p is actually above the
uniform retail stamp price of 30p (assumed to continue for single-item services), and so an entrant
in the bulk mail service would be better o¤ simply re-mailing its rural mail in the incumbents
street mail boxes than using the cost-based access product.
14One potential downside, however, is that an entrant could have a rural delivery cost of 30p say
(as compared to the incumbents cost of 40p), and still prefer to use the incumbents network. That
is to say, there is scope for lack of e¢ cient bypass with such a policy.
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o¤ered retail prices 20p and 50p respectively for urban and rural mail services, the
optimal policy is simply for entrants to have access to the incumbents delivery net-
work at actual cost (respectively, 10p and 40p) and the need for a universal service
fund is avoided.
However, this convenient conclusion cannot so easily be made if there are signif-
icant xed costs, in addition to the variable costs presented in Table 3. However,
in some cases regulation can still be simplied somewhat. Suppose, as discussed at
the end of section 2, the incumbent incurs a xed cost of £ 600m to serve these two
sectors. To fund this xed cost, suppose there is an equi-proportionate mark-up of
retail prices over marginal costs, which (with inelastic demand) entails retail prices
of 331
3
p and 831
3
p per item for urban and rural services if the incumbent is to break
even. In this case a policy of charging entrants for access at (marginal) cost is prob-
lematic. If an entrant can use the incumbents delivery network at cost (10p and
40p respectively), and no output taxes are levied, it could be much less e¢ cient than
the incumbent in the pick-up segment, and still nd it protable to enter given the
incumbents high retail prices. In addition to the ine¢ ciency of this outcome, the in-
cumbent will nd it impossible to nance its xed cost if widespread cream-skimming
entry occurs. Therefore, ideally an output tax continues to be required, even though
retail prices are rebalanced, in order to ensure that only e¢ cient entry occurs and that
the incumbents xed costs are nanced. However, as in section 2, since price/cost
markups are equal in the two regions, the entrant need only pay its output taxes as
a simple proportion (in this case, 40%) of its total revenues, and there is no need to
monitor the entrants activities in the two regions at a disaggregated level. If output
taxes are not administratively feasible, then some other means need to be found to
prevent ine¢ cient cream-skimming entry. One possible compromise might be to add
a mark-up on the access charges as a contribution to the incumbents xed cost.
4 Conclusions
This note is intended to provide a simple and tractable framework for discussing access
pricing in postal service. In section 3.1 I argued that the appropriate regulated margin
was the ECPR margin, at least for those services where entrants have no scope to
bypass the incumbents delivery network. In section 3.2 I discussed how problems
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emerge with this policy when entrants have the ability to deliver mail themselves.
The ECPR policy might mean that for some services access charges are substantially
above the associated costs, and in these cases an entrant might decide to deliver its
own mail even if its costs of doing so are substantially above the incumbents. Such
an outcome is both ine¢ cient and erodes the incumbents ability to fund its other
services. Therefore, regulators should be sympathetic to the principle of cost-reective
access charges, especially if the associated retail prices are also cost-reective. If
the incumbents retail prices cannot be fully rebalanced to reect marginal costs
(e.g., because of universal service constraints or because retail prices must cover
xed costs of operation), the regulator will need to use some form of output tax
for entrants. Carefully designed output taxes give appropriate signals for e¢ cient
entry, and they also serve to contribute to the nancing of the incumbents xed
costs and/or universal service subsides.
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